Introduction
New Zealand has a long-standing reputation as a country in which there is little or no governmental corruption. A seldom asked question is: why is this so? In fact, the reasons as to why any country has high or low levels of corruption are seldom self-evident, and usually beg closer examination. There are several main factors, discussed below, which provide an answer to this question in New Zealand's case. However, circumstances change, and there is no guarantee that either corruption generally or governmental corruption specifically will not become significant problems in New Zealand. There are some signs, which are examined here, which suggest that while relative to other countries New Zealand continues to enjoy very low levels of corruption, nevertheless there is no room for national complacency on this issue, certainly not if concern is gauged against the country's own high standards. The country's strong international reputation in this regard, which in itself is an important national asset, could be subjected to significantly closer scrutiny in the years ahead.
New Zealand and the Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI)
New Zealand has long been rated by Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as one of the six least corrupt countries in the world. It was rated as first, or first equal (that is, perceived as the least corrupt or equally least corrupt country in the world), in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 , sitting alone atop the rankings in 2009 and 2011, and sharing the top position again (with Denmark and Finland) in 2012. New Zealand's image as a country in which there is very little, if any, governmental corruption is all the more impressive because of the country's bicultural and multi-cultural character, as charges and counter-charges of corruption are thought to be far more common in multi-cultural settings. The CPI model largely avoids rapid shifts in rankings, and may even carry with it a propensity to serve as a self-fulfilling factor. And one of the founding members of TI has argued that the CPI, following the advent in 2003 of the United Nations cultural and social factors which often are at least as, if not more, important in understanding why some countries have lower levels of corruption than others. In fact, each country has its own particular narrative. A good example of such a narrative is the following, offered as a partial explanation of the rise in corruption in Spain around the mid-2000s: …in the years following Franco's death (1975) up to the early 1990s, the focus of the builders of the new local and regional politico-administrative structures-that is to say, mainly the Socialists-was on weakening the administrative controls on local governments inherited from the dictatorship…The building of a public administration for the new democracy was largely neglected. This shortcoming was accompanied by an outsized interpretation by the Constitutional Court and others of the newly acquired municipal autonomy bestowed uniformly on all municipalities by the 1978 constitution…These two elements (large autonomy and weak control) led to a very weak checks and balances system…and to the assumption that at the local and regional government levels, a politician winning an election had carte blanche, an unrestricted power to do as he saw fit (Cardona, 2013: 95) .
For the purposes of comparison, it is not difficult to provide, for example, a plausible explanation as to why Somalia has much more corruption than Denmark, an explanation that will owe much more to historical and cultural factors than to principal-agent differences. Conversely, historical and cultural factors are likely to be less important than principal-agent approaches in explaining why two countries, Denmark and New Zealand, are consistently ranked on the CPI as being largely corruption-free. In comparisons like this, cultural and historical factors seem less important than the fact that both countries are highly rated on the WGI.
In such cases comparative investigation into cultural and historical elements seems irrelevant. century (see Griffin, 1990 Griffin, , 2004 . While this form of politics was not completely absent in New
Zealand, it was much less common. However, while it might seem plausible-on the face of it-to suggest that Australia's 19 th century history as a British penal colony gave rise to non-compliance norms and values (presumably because a higher propensity for unlawful behaviour has been passed down through Australian generations), it would be drawing a very long bow to conclude that this helps to explain why there have been higher overall levels of corruption, or at least the perceptions thereof, in Australia than in New Zealand. Ironically, the central figure in New Zealand's early colonisation-the director of the New Zealand Company, Edward Gibbon Wakefield-had in 1827
himself been sentenced to three years in London's Newgate prison on abduction charges (Temple, 2002 ).
We will sketch some reasons as to why New Zealand, in its own terms, has enjoyed for so long a reputation for having very low levels of corruption, especially in government. There are two interrelated issues: New Zealand's reputation as being a country with very low levels of corruption, on the one hand, and the reality of corruption in New Zealand, on the other. Clearly, most of the available evidence suggests that the reputation quite closely matches the reality: there are unlikely to be expanding black seams of governmental venality occluded behind the country's 'clean and green' and corruption-free image. Accepting that proposition then, we find that any explanation of why this is the case must take the form of some story, a narrative that blends historical, social, political and cultural dimensions into a reasonably coherent and plausible explanation. The alternative-a rigorous scientific collation and interpretation of hard data, producing a conclusive result-is almost certainly beyond practical reach.
We suggest that perhaps the most important factor has been New Zealand's strong egalitarian ethos that underwrote one of the world's first welfare states (King, 2003; Lipson, 1948; Sutch, 1969 The nooks and corners that [New Zealand] has explored in its Fascist rule may be seen from the fact that it has forbidden the building of any more movie theatres without permission, on the ground that there are already more than enough, has refused to issue any more leases to coal operators to mine on State lands because of over-production of coal, and has even determined to register and control all persons who own ten hens or more and sell eggs….Slowly this democracy is turning into a Fascist State. When it completes the cycle it will do so with a thoroughness which will fill the Black Shirts with envy (New York Times, December 11, 1930: E4) .
As two commentators later said about the New Zealand government's economic stabilization programme, during the Second World War, '…the government was engaged in an elaborate piece of social engineering. Ministers were attempting to construct a wartime economy that would treat all sections as fairly as possible' (Bassett and King, 2000: 201) . Another has called the country's egalitarian ethos 'a society of fair shares' (Roberts, 1978: 73) .
Nevertheless, any relationship between egalitarianism-especially as 'fairness'-and corruption itself awaits adequate explanation (Gregory, 2003 Cardona (2013: 95) said that, 'I could not agree more with the concluding remarks of the article: "institutional designs and procedures that promote accountability and transparency in government, to the extent that they prevent corruption, may help diminish disaffection and promote compliance with laws and social norms." For the sake of completeness, I
would only add that if policies also promote equality, the propensity to seek corrupt deals dwindles.' Again though, the question is-why? It might be because egalitarianism per se, that is, income equality, does not keep corruption at minimal levels, but that egalitarianism itself reflects a social ethos which places a relatively low emphasis on acquisitive and competitive values, especially those which define social status overwhelmingly as a function of wealth.
Another important and allied factor in New Zealand was the strong Calvinist culture that the country's British settlers brought with them, especially from Scotland, and which endured at least until the middle of the 20 th century. Values of thrift, hard work, and social cohesion were central to the country's development as 'God's Own Country' (or 'Godzone', as it is more cynically referred to today), a relatively prosperous, modern mixed economy, a welfare state built on land-based primary industry. Throughout most of the 20 th century, until the loss of primary markets, and the oil shocks in the 1970s, New Zealand's economic policies were deeply interwoven with its egalitarian social structure. These policies embodied the key objectives of full employment, financial stability, favourable terms of trade, and high productivity.
Further, New Zealand is a small country -today with a population of 4.45 million. As an island nation in the south Pacific, it has also been largely 'quarantined' from international influences that might otherwise have threatened to strain its social fabric. At least until Māori migration from rural to urban areas from the 1950s onwards, the rapid rise in Pacific Island immigration from about the same time, and the rapid increase in Asian immigrants from the 1980s, the country was dominated by European New Zealanders, fostering at least the illusion of a homogenous culture and society.
Especially during the decades when New Zealand was even less populous than it is today, urban and provincial communities enjoyed high levels of social capital, reciprocal bonds of collective cooperation and high levels of interpersonal trust. Thorstein Veblen's 'conspicuous consumption' was in these times scarcely apparent in New Zealand, not because high levels of individual and family wealth did not exist, but because strong social norms and expectations ensured that it was seldom flaunted. Social 'respectability' was highly valued and most people were wary about engaging in any form of behaviour which, if exposed to public scrutiny, would result in a loss of individual or family reputation. In many ways, therefore, the social and political climate in New Zealand was for a long time highly conformist, indeed in many ways stifling; but at the same time it was not an environment encouraging of those with corrupt intent. In short, New Zealand was largely a country of innocence, straight-laced, rather naïve and unsophisticated, and with virtually no organised crime built around prostitution, gambling, or boot-legging. Even low-level tipping was not socially acceptable. The New Zealand Police (formerly called the New Zealand Police Force) was itself almost entirely devoid of the sort of corruption commonly associated with police behaviour in other countries, including New Zealand's trans-Tasman neighbour, Australia (Holmes, 2010) .
Unlike Australia, New Zealand has had a unitary system of government since its fledgling provincial governments were abolished in 1876. Like Australia, however, its head of state is the British monarch, and both countries inherited the Westminster model of Parliamentary democracy, though each has developed its own parochial version of that system (Weller, Wanna and Patapan, 2005) . New Zealand was a full-fledged member of the 'Old Commonwealth' -along with Britain, Canada, South Africa, and Australia, countries not known for having significant levels of governmental corruption. New Zealand did not acquire formal constitutional independence from
Britain until 1947, but in the preceding decades had achieved a great deal of de facto independence.
In this era of nation-building, the passage through Parliament of the Public Service Act of 1912 (coming into force the following year) was a seminal and foundational event. The Act, consistent with developments in other parts of the English-speaking world, established a unified, professional, merit-based public service career system, one that was centrally controlled, and that endured until the radical state sector reforms of the 1980s and 90s. The Act put a stop to the rampant political patronage that had hitherto characterised public service employment in the preceding decades. It laid the foundation for the emergence of a strong public service ethos, which became instilled in employees from the time of their initial recruitment after leaving school or university until their retirement from this essentially closed-shop career 30 or 40 years later. During this time, most employees saw themselves generically and collectively as 'public servants', regardless of the positions they as individuals held, or the roles that they performed. According to Webb (1940: 84) , 'Every cadet who enters the service does so in the knowledge that there are no barriers to his [sic] advancement to the highest positions, that his capacities will be impartially assessed, that his right of appeal against decisions affecting his status and salary is carefully safeguarded, and that he will be adequately pensioned on his retirement.' Fairness was again a key value. Similarly, as Lipson (1948: 479) argued in his a seminal commentary on New Zealand's egalitarianism, 'there is a commendable absence of graft and a strict code of honesty', attributable in his view to job security, strict accounting and audit requirements, and also to an 'inner check' reflecting public servants' professional commitment to the ideal of the public interest'. This 'normative model' was in turn strongly reinforced by rigorous controls exercised over government officials, controls which allowed zero tolerance of any form of behaviour that could be defined as corrupt or even unethical. As a leading New Zealand public service practitioner-scholar wrote in the late-1950s:
There seems to be common in New Zealand a notion that the responsibilities and moral obligations of public servants are somehow substantially greater than those of other citizens…If his standard of conduct is more scrupulous-and, in some respects it is-the reason is to be found largely in the self-interest of the public servant. He is subject to more extensive controls than most private citizens: he is more likely to be caught if he commits an indiscretion: his career may suffer even if there is only suspicion of unsatisfactory conduct (Polaschek, 1958: 283) .
New Zealand was the first country to introduce the Danish institution of the Ombudsman, in 1962, as a further means of control over executive authority, and it opened up official information to the public in the early 1980s, well before the abolition of the Official Secrets Act in Britain. Albeit heavily controlled, a career in the service of government gave employees secure employment as long as they remained totally non-corrupt, and even if they were only adequately competent.
Nor was the financial grass necessarily greener in the private sector. Security of tenure was not really bought at the cost of substantially lower wages than those available in the private sector.
The 'public service discount' was not only generally minimal, but under the 'mildly corporate' system of wage-fixing that characterised New Zealand's industrial relations for several decades, state sector pay rates were often seen to be ahead of those available in private employment (Roberts, 1978) . 4 However, as Lipson (1948: 481-82) This strong normative ethos was greatly reinforced during the years of World War II by the serendipitous convergence into top leadership positions in the New Zealand public service of a group of several highly capable men, all able practitioners of 'the profession of statecraft' (Martin, 1988) . One leading public administration scholar has suggested that the period 1940 to 1951 was 'the age of mandarins' in New Zealand government (Martin, 2010) . If Ralph Waldo Emerson (1841) believed that 'an institution is the lengthened shadow of one man', then as a institutional whole the New Zealand public service could be seen to embody key values shared by this group of men. They were fully committed to the tacit 'Schafferian Bargain' which shaped the relationship between the political executive and the top levels of the public service (Hood and Lodge, 2006) , though the idea of 'serial loyalty' (to successive governments of a different political stripe) on the part of the mandarins was not really tested, as the first Labour Government held office for 14 years, from 1935 to 1949. 5 Characterising one of these men, as if describing them all, Duff (1941: 95) observed that, 'He is a public servant. With his energy, ability and bold imagination, he could have had a half a dozen careers and made half a dozen reputations. But he entered the public service. He remained in the public service. He is the public service …' The commitment to impartiality and the rule of law in the administration of public policy was very powerful in New Zealand (and remains so). This cohort of outstanding top officials clearly understood that the opposite of impartiality in public office was the use of that office for illegitimate private gain, and through their own behaviour they set standards that became deeply embedded in the culture of New Zealand public service (Gregory, 1999) .
Nor was it irrelevant that these public service 'mandarins' lived and worked in the capital city of Wellington, located in the centre of the country, at the foot of the North Island. They would, of course, have made their collective impression in the centre of government, wherever it had been located, but the fact that Wellington had been chosen as the capital city in 1865 by New Zealand's then Governor, Sir George Grey, was a significant factor in the emergence of a largely non-corrupt governmental system. Prior to that choice, from 1841 to 1865, the capital city had been Auckland, in the north of the North Island. Auckland had always been, as it is today, by far New Zealand's largest city, but it was in those days not only the centre of government, but also a city imbued with the spirit of commercial entrepreneurship and associated 'wheeling and dealing', with money the predominant standard by which success was measured. (This remains largely the case today.) By choosing Wellington as the new capital city, albeit largely for logistical reasons, Governor Grey was also laying the foundation for a capital city whose culture would be shaped by governmental rather than commercial values and institutions, and thus would be less likely-especially in these earlier decades of cultural emergence-to become tainted with corruption.
The year 1865 was squarely in the middle of the New Zealand Wars, previously known as the 'Land Wars,' or the 'Māori Wars,' which were fought from 1845 to 1872 between the forces of the colonial government (the Crown) and many Māori iwi (tribes) (Belich, 1998; King, 2003 This whole issue is raised here because it shows how any consideration of corruption in the history of New Zealand government needs also to be viewed from the perspectives of Māori, who were victims of unjust practices perpetrated by the Crown and its agents mainly in the 19 th century, notwithstanding the fact that the early colonial administration in New Zealand had been at pains to deal fairly and honestly with land acquisition and settlement issues. Indeed, it would not be drawing too long a bow to see much of this behaviour by the Crown's agents as a form of 'greed', corruption, even though public officials themselves may not have been the prime beneficiaries. 6 If corruption as a governmental phenomenon has to be gauged largely by perceptions of its incidence, then it clearly matters as to who is doing the perceiving. Just as 'seeing is believing', so too is the converse the case: 'believing is [not] seeing.' In this connection, it is worth quoting from two of the most acute historical observers of New Zealand society, to help understand why perhaps New
Zealanders' national self-image, born of cultural insecurity, has tended to be self-congratulatory rather than self-critical. The French political commentator, André Siegfried, in 1914 published his observations of New Zealand society, wryly noting that, 'Many New Zealanders are honestly convinced that the attention of the whole world is concentrated on them, waiting with curiosity and even with anxiety to see what they will say and do next…they have become so accustomed to being taken seriously that they have become conscious of a mission to humanity' (Siegfried, 1914: 58-59) .
Writing nearly half a century later, Lipson (1948: 459-60) , noted that this attitude was still prevalent. 'The publicity of the government, the press, and a host of private organisations constantly assures the public that New Zealand leads the world in this, that, and the other', he noted.
'So often is the point repeated and asserted about so many features of the Dominion's life that it is now earnestly believed by the majority. It is held as a faith which few call in question…Under its worst forms it can degenerate into smugness and complacency, the national delusion of the selfsatisfied.'
A changing picture of corruption in New Zealand
In socially, ethnically and financially-'in terms of rich and poor in our society'-a 'very different country than we were a few years ago and, particularly since the global financial crisis' (Birchfield, 2012) . The former director dismissed the value of the CPI's rating of New Zealand: in his view, company directors and legislators were sweeping the country's growing crime and corruption problem under the board table.' In support of his arguments, he cited the results of an SFO survey, which indicated that a majority of New Zealanders did not share the CPI's view of corruption in their country: only 37% of respondents believed that the country was 'largely free' of serious fraud and corruption. At the height of the share market boom before the October 1987 crash, illegal and dodgy commercial practices were rife. According to Bruce Jesson (1999: 126) , 'Not only did the ethical standards of business collapse during the share market boom, but so also did the notion that there should even be ethical standards...'
A Price Waterhouse Cooper/Office of the Auditor-General (2011) survey of fraud and corruption in New Zealand organisations of various sizes found that such events in the previous two years, with a cost of more than $100,000, were reported by up to eight percent of respondents.
Fraud and/or corruption events in the previous two years, with a cost of between $10,000 and $100,000, were reported by up to 9.5 percent of those surveyed. A KPMG survey in 2012 of fraud, bribery and corruption in Australia and New Zealand, while not providing separate data on each country, found that 'almost three-quarters of respondents reported that their organisation has experienced behaviours that are defined as bribery or corruption' (KPMG, 2013: 34) . Moreover, while perpetrators of fraud were more likely to be non-management employees, a 'real concern' was that fraud committed by senior executives and company directors had doubled since 2006 (KPMG, 2013: 9) . The study also found that more than half of the respondents indicated that their organisations did not perform active monitoring of bribery and corruption payments. There is no central clearing house for information about the prosecution and conviction of New Zealand public officials on corruption or fraud charges, but some casual research only between 2001 and 2005 uncovered a not insubstantial list (Gregory, Zirker and Scrimgeour, 2012: 14-15; Gregory, 2002 Gregory, , 2006 . See Appendix. It can also be noted in this connection that New Zealand has no common law offence of 'Misconduct in Public Office', such as exists in Hong Kong.)
More needs to be known about how New Zealanders perceive activities that could be called The second risk factor, according to the Commissioner, was the fact that personal information had become 'a marketable and valuable commodity'.
Corruption issues and reputational risks in New Zealand
The relationship between corruption and national reputation in countries with a free press is typically mediated by the national news media. New Zealand's impressive successes in combatting corruption, retaining its CPI status as the perceived least corrupt country in the world, and as the best place to do business, 8 as well as a veritable parade of other impressive rankings and awards, are ceremonially and repeatedly recorded in the country's news media. Nevertheless, dire warnings of the 'slippery slope' of corruption, and the need for 'more transparency', also figure prominently, occasionally in the same reports. 9 It is clear that New Zealanders have a lot to lose, although repeated sterling non-corruption rankings lead to complacency, and represent a potential disincentive to anti-corruption policy-making, and vigilance in defence against corruption. Even as national corruption scandals, 'loopholes' in New Zealand's legislation, the apparent growth of organised crime, and, perhaps-most threatening of all-the rapid growth of income inequality in New Zealand, make their way into headlines, New Zealand's international reputation seems to prosper. How long will this last?
Corruption scandals have increased exponentially in the last five years, at least in their coverage in New Zealand's media. The most prominent recent example of these followed the New Zealand Police arrest (in concert with the American FBI) of Kim Dotcom, a multi-millionaire German internet site operator with a shady past, residing in New Zealand and accused of massive copyright violations through his 'Mega Upload' site, which at one point accounted for nearly five percent of the world's internet traffic. Dotcom (his name changed legally to reflect his occupation) seems to have had special support in his successful bid for New Zealand residency. 10 Soon after his arrest he announced that a member of the ruling National Party coalition, John Banks-the only Revelations in 2012 that a loophole in New Zealand's trust laws allows off-shore parties with no legal connection to New Zealand to establish tax-free trust havens suggest a further challenge to the country's non-corrupt reputation. 18 As an intermediary for Cayman Islands-style banking secrecy, it is increasingly presumed that New Zealand is indirectly benefitting through its trust system from global financial malfeasance, at least some of which is certain to be corruption.
A recent Bill before the House to control the worst excesses of Parliamentary 'lobbying' underscores yet another risk to New Zealand's non-corrupt reputation. 19 Largely uncontrolled lobbying in Parliament has increasingly been reported in the news media as a growing problem that is often linked to corruption. Efforts to regulate lobbying have encountered significant resistance, 20 raising further doubts about the authenticity of New Zealand's reputation. 21 Open access to the nation's MPs has long been seen as a hallmark of New Zealand's vibrant democracy. Lobbyists have quickly come to represent a direct threat to the country's non-corrupt reputation, and thus to its democratic tradition.
Arguably, the most corrosive change in New Zealand society is the marked growth in income inequality that has beset the country since the neo-liberalisation of the state, beginning in 1988, and its impact upon a putative growth in corrupt tendencies. As news reports noted in 2011 and 2012, the gap between the rich and the poor has increased more than in any other OECD country over the past two decades, on top of a widening gap in all other OECD countries. 22 A recent Salvation Army report stresses this, arguing that increasing numbers of New Zealanders had been marginalised in the last two years. 23 This manifests itself immediately in the well-being (or lack thereof) of children, 25 With the wealthiest one per cent of the population now owning three times more than 'the combined cash and assets of the poorest 50 per cent', 26 the presumption is that increasing crime, including corruption, and even a surge in some diseases, might result.
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Probably the most aggressive current assault on New Zealand's non-corrupt reputation is materialising in the city of Christchurch's rebuilding project, following the destructive earthquakes of 4 September 2010, and 22 February 2011 . Despite explicit warnings in the national media of the potential for fraud and corruption in the multi-billion dollar rebuilding project, 28 contractors using public funds have made significant use of illegal migrants, paying miniscule wages, and in violation of visa restrictions. 29 Another alleged fraud, worth 'billions of dollars', was reported in the national media to be under investigation by the Serious Fraud Office in late 2012.
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Conclusion
In providing a set of largely narrative reasons as to why New Zealand has for a very long time been a country without significant levels of governmental and other corruption, and while suggesting that the country's top ranking on the CPI does not tell the full, or even the most interesting story, we do not mean to imply that all of a sudden corruption is becoming a major problem in New Zealand. Rather, we argue that there are significant recent signs that it is becoming an issue of increasing, if still little recognised, public importance, and that the country's strong international reputation may warrant closer scrutiny. While recent evidence may go nowhere near indicating that corruption in New Zealand may grow to a scale comparable to that in many other countries, nevertheless, if New Zealanders are genuinely concerned to maintain the standards they have been accustomed to in the past, then more public policy attention may soon need to be given to this complex and difficult issue.
